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Abstract 
Can we be realists about a general category but pluralists about concepts relating to that 
category? I argue that paleobiological methods of delineating species are not affected by 
differing species concepts, and that this underwrites an argument that species concept pluralists 
should be species category realists. First, the criteria by which paleobiologists delineate species is 
‘indifferent’ to the species category. That is, their method for identifying species applies equally 
to any species concept. To identify a new species, paleobiologists show that interspecies 
processes, such as phenotypic plasticity (including pathology), sexual dimorphism, or 
ontogenetic diversity, are a worse explanation of the variance between specimens than 
intraspecies processes. As opposed to operating under a single or plurality of species concepts, 
then, paleobiologists use abductive inferences, which would be required regardless of any 
particular species concept. Second, paleobiologists are frequently interested in large-scale, long-
term morphological patterns in the fossil record, and resolving the fine-grained differences which 
result from different species concepts is irrelevant at those scales. I argue that this claim about 
paleobiological practice supports what I call ‘indifference realism’ about the species category. 
The indifference realist argues that when legitimate investigation is indifferent to a plurality of 




Some scientific or folk categories plausibly fail to be captured by a single concept. In such 
circumstances, what could licence realism about those categories? That is, what could lead us to 
take the category as an objective, mind-independent feature of the world? I will argue that one 
road to category-realism in the face of concept-pluralism is via ‘indifference’. The category is 
necessary for some legitimate scientific (or other knowledge-producing) project, but the plurality 
of concepts attached to that category do not make a difference to how that project proceeds. I 
shall demonstrate ‘indifference realism’ in the species debate. 
One way of being a concept pluralist about a scientific category is to demonstrate that there 
are at least two non-equivalent specifications of that category which each underwrite a 
legitimate research program. A ‘specification’ of a category divides up the world: who gets to be 
a member of that category, and how are within-category delineations made? For instance, the 
biological species concept is a specification of the species category, as it tells us that 
interbreeding populations count as species. In regards to species, pluralism is popular amongst 
philosophers of biology1—although, as we shall see, there is significant disagreement about a 
further question. Namely, ought we be realists about the species category, or ought it be 
abandoned in favour of a group of more specific categories or particular taxa? I will introduce a 
different kind of pluralism, and one which underwrites realism about the species category. The 
pluralism works like this: a category has at least two, non-equivalent specifications—however, 
there is a legitimate research programme which is ‘indifferent’ to those specifications. That is, it 
makes no difference to the programme’s methodology which specification is preferred and, 
moreover, there is good reason to not bother with those specifications. This kind of pluralism, I 
argue, is seen in paleobiology. This leads to realism on the basis of the legitimacy of 
paleobiological investigation. Just as species concepts are legitimized by their use in various 
scientific endeavours, so is the species category legitimized by paleobiology. When I refer to 
                                                             
1But see Sober (1994), Wilkins (2003, 2009), Hull (1988), Ghislen (1987). 
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‘realism’, then, I will usually mean realism about a general category—species—rather than about 
specific taxa. 
The argument will proceed via a representative case study: the recent debate about the 
taxonomic relationship between two North American Ceratopsidae, Triceratops and Torosaurus. 
As we shall see, paleobiologists determine phylogenetic relationships on an explanatory basis. In 
order to establish a new species, they must show that the divergences between specimens which 
are possibly due to separate evolutionary histories are not better explained by within-species 
variation. Their criteria are ‘indifferent’, in a sense I will define, to the species category. 
Moreover, I shall argue that this indifference is not merely due to paleobiologists lacking fine-
grained information about the past: in some cases their indifference is due to their explanatory 
interests.  
I shall, then, make a claim about paleobiological practice: species delineations are made on 
explanatory grounds and are indifferent to the species category, that is, differing species 
concepts do not make a difference to their method. From this claim, I shall make metaphysical 
hay via what is, in effect, a parity of reasoning argument. Many pluralists are realists about the 
taxa picked out by species concepts on the basis of the legitimacy of scientific practice. They 
appeal to a link between successful employment in scientific investigation and ontology. I’ll argue 
that paleobiological use of species is indifferent to—ranges over—different species concepts, 
and is moreover legitimate. This suggests that we should be realists about the general species 
category. 
Although this paper is clearly geared towards philosophical debate about species and realism 
about categories in general, it does have an important insight for paleobiologists who might be 
less concerned with that issue. In conversation at least, paleobiologists sometimes express 
concern about varying species concepts: they are very aware of the ambiguity of ‘species’. The 
argument in section 4 should put their minds to rest about this: even though ‘species’ can be 
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ambiguous, it is not ambiguous in a way which matters to paleobiological investigation (indeed, 
as we’ll see, paleobiological discussion of ‘species’ often isn’t ambiguous at all!). 
2. Pluralism & Realism 
Let’s begin by sketching the debate. A traditional species pluralist holds that there are at least 
two, non-equivalent, and equally legitimate species concepts. Many philosophers of biology 
agree2. It is more contentious whether pluralists can be realists about the species category.  That 
is, whether the category itself is part of mind-independent, objective reality. I’ll first sketch two 
examples of species concepts which potentially meet the pluralist’s criteria, before shifting to the 
debate about category realism.  
It is important to distinguish pluralism from the view that anything goes: the idea that species 
are just whatever scientists say they are, that is, that there are no ontic or epistemic constraints 
on species-concepts. For the pluralist, although there is a plurality of species concepts, not just 
any will do. Concepts are granted legitimacy by playing some ineliminable role in a research 
programme which is itself legitimate. There are, then, three ways of denying pluralism: by 
demonstrating that species concepts are equivalent, by arguing that species concepts are 
eliminable, or by denying the legitimacy of the corresponding research programme. As we’ll see, 
for pluralists, claims about different concepts often gain ontological force in virtue of their 
scientific legitimacy.  
Let’s compare two species concepts. The biological species concept takes species to be 
reproductively isolated groups. To find out whether two organisms are of the same species, I 
need to know facts about their group-membership, and the extent to which those groups 
interbreed3. The phylogenetic species concept takes species to be ancestral individuals, that is, 
                                                             
2 For instance, Kitcher (1984), Mishler & Brandon (1987), Dupre (1999), Ereshefsky (2001), Reydon 
(2004), O’Malley & Dupre (2007). 
3 See Mayr (1942), Dobzhansky (1937), Paterson (1985) and Ghiselin (1987) for variations. 
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organisms are the same species in case they share relevant ancestors. Here, I need to know facts 
about the organisms’ evolutionary histories to know about species membership. These concepts 
are non-equivalent4. To take a simple example, asexual organisms (depending on how we define 
‘reproduction’) do not sexually reproduce, and so on the face of it are each species unto 
themselves by the biological concept5. However, they do form meaningful ancestral groups, and 
so by the phylogenetic concept can be considered species. Moreover, it is plausible that these 
non-equivalent concepts are better suited to some research programs than others. Again, the 
biological species concept (at least naively) looks next to useless for asexual taxa, whereas a 
phylogenetic approach has, perhaps, some legs. In other contexts, the biological species concept 
could be more applicable. For instance, phylogenetic species concepts restrict species to 
monophyletic groups, however there is sometimes reason to admit paraphyletic groups as 
legitimate taxa. For instance, even-toed ungulates are a paraphyletic group, as monophyly would 
require the addition of cetacea. However, given their morphological and environmental 
divergence from their land-locked cousins, excluding whales and dolphins is surely legitimate in 
some contexts (see Funk & Ormland 2003 and Ereshefksy 2001 for species-level examples).  
Whether either of these are ineliminable from their prospective projects is a more difficult 
question: perhaps one could be ultimately abandoned, or the work could be done by some other 
species concept, at which point pluralism would fail. 
An argument for species pluralism, then, demonstrates that two concepts are non-
equivalent, and play ineliminable roles in legitimate research projects. Let’s imagine that we are 
convinced by arguments for pluralism about species concepts. That is, we believe in the 
legitimacy of a plurality of species concepts—such as the biological and phylogenetic. Moreover, 
let us accept the realist connection between legitimate scientific practice and ontology. Roughly, 
                                                             
4 See Avise & Wollenberg (1997) and Baum & Shaw (1995). 
5 Again, this is an extremely simplified discussion, see Andam et al (2010), Bapteste & Burian (2010), 
Bapteste et al (2009) and Ereshefsky (2010) for more details on the relationship between species concepts, 
eukaryotes and other asexual organisms. 
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if a concept is successfully employed in a legitimate science, this gives me licence to be a realist 
about the category or kind that the concept delineates. For instance, if the phylogenetic species 
concept meets this criteria, then I am given leave to believe both in that kind—ancestral, 
phylogenetic individuals—and in the specific taxa that concept picks out. There is, undoubtedly, a 
lot more to be said about the mechanics and plausibility of the link between scientific legitimacy 
and ontological realism6. I will take it that pluralists about species taxa are often so on the basis 
of such a link, and that is all I need for the parity of reasoning argument in section 5.  
A further question arises: what is the fate of the species category? In the face of concept 
pluralism, do we have grounds for believing that there is a general class or kind? Realists argue 
for retention, anti-realists for abandonment.  
One kind of anti-realist argument focuses on the epistemological upshots of pluralism 
(Stanford 1995, Rosenberg 1994). According to species pluralism, the biological world is subject 
to many possible carvings, but we cannot establish whether any particular carving is the right 
one, and so we should remain agnostic about the general species category: one specification 
might, after all, be correct, but we can never know. Ereshefsky (1998) provides an anti-realist 
argument directly from disunity: there is an abundance of evidence that the biological world is 
correctly, and legitimately, carved into various base taxa, which we call ‘species’, but those taxa 
come in varying types. The problem, for him, is not a lack of information but an overabundance.  
Crucially, Ereshefsky drives his anti-realism about the general category by relying on the same link 
between scientific legitimacy and ontology which underlies pluralism. As he says, 
… contemporary biological theory provides ample evidence that the tree of life is 
segmented by biological forces into different types of species taxa. Consequently, there 
is no single unitary species category, but a heterogeneous collection of base taxa referred 
to by the term ‘species’ (104). 
                                                             
6 A good place to look for skepticism about such a link is Kyle Stanford’s work, for instance his (2006). 
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So, anti-realists argue either that, say, the clash between the biological and phylogenetic 
species concepts leads to an epistemological gap, undermining legitimate belief in ‘species’, or 
that the biological and phylogenetic species concepts carve out two real base taxa, but this 
means that ‘species’ picks out a disunified, and thus unreal, category.  
For a promiscuous realist such as Dupre (1993), it is doubtful that picking out a 
heterogeneous, disunified class is any block to that class’ existence and legitimacy. Some realists 
have responded by attempting to unify species. Brigandt (2003), for instance, argues that there is 
a general ‘phenomena’ of species, base-level biological patterns which require explanation, and 
that various species concepts are different explanans of that pattern. There is a unified pattern, 
‘species’, but the pattern is produced by disunified processes, represented by the various 
concepts (see De Queiroz 1999 for another realist response which attempts to unify species as 
‘base taxa’). I am going to explore a different route to realism about the species category. As we 
shall see, the view emerges from a consideration of how paleobiologists identify taxa. 
3. The ‘Toroceratops’ Debate 
The Ceratopsidae were a diverse family of quadruped herbivorous dinosaurs, marked out by 
their distinctive beaks, shearing rows of back teeth and—most especially—their horns and 
crested frills. They lived at the close of the Mesozoic period, and (or so it was thought) at least 
two genera, Triceratops and Torosaurus, were present until the extinction event at the dawn of 
the Palaeogene. However, the relationship between Triceratops and Torosaurus has been 
questioned. By one view, the ‘Toroceratops’ hypothesis, they are representatives of different life 
stages of the same animal, while by the traditional view they are separate genera. I shall use this 
debate to illustrate how paleobiologists make taxonomic decisions, and the kinds of 
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investigations these decisions inform. Note that although Triceratops and Torosaurus are genus-
level rather than species-level categories, the lessons carry over7. 
Since their discovery in the late 19th Century, Triceratops and Torosaurus were assigned 
separate genera. The two are distinguished morphologically, particularly by their distinctive 
‘frills’. Torosaurus frills are large and thin, sporting two ‘holes’, while Triceratops’ are thicker and 
squatter (see fig.1). Moreover, Torosaurus are much rarer than Triceratops and tend to be larger: 
while Triceratops range in size from .5 to 2 meters tall, Torosaurus range from 2 to 3 meters.  
 
Figure 1: Triceratops vs Torosaurus skull (Image credit: Dinosaurs by W. D. Matthew (1915); public domain.) 
In 2006, Horner & Goodwin argued that the skull of Triceratops developed extensively during 
ontogeny8. They identified four growth stages, each marked by systematic transformation of the 
skull. For instance, the Triceratops’ distinctive horns leaned backwards towards the frill in 
juveniles, but switched to forward facing (as they are in figure 1) in young adulthood. If 
                                                             
7 I skate over some subtlety here. Ereshefsky (2001) has pointed out that, if we don’t think there is an 
interesting difference between species and higher taxa, this is a kind of species anti-realism. If that is right, 
then my argument is for taxa-category realism, rather than species-category realism. I am comfortable with 
this—realism about some category is fine with me: I won’t quibble about whether we get to call them 
‘species’. I return to these points in 6.4.  
8 Speculating about extreme changes in dinosaur life-stages has become de-rigour. It has been 
suggested, for instance, that the enormous sauropods both led very different lives in their juvenile and 
adult stages, for instance it has been speculated that they switched from fast-growing endothermy to 
relaxed ectothermy mid-life (Farlow 1990). It has also been suggested that Tyrannosaurus rex had two 
distinctive ontogenetic stages, a juvenile stage characterized by fast running speeds and feathers, and a 
slow, featherless adult packing a major bite (see Currie 1998 & Erickson et al 2004).  
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Triceratops cranial development is highly plastic, then mistaking differences in life stages for 
differences in taxa is a real possibility. In 2010, Scannella & Horner suggested just this. 
Scannella & Horner argue that specimens previously identified as ‘Torosaurus’ were, in fact, 
mature Triceratops. First, by extrapolating Horner & Goodwin’s developmental trajectory, they 
suggest that Torosaurus skull morphology is within Triceratops range. To abstract from the detail, 
Scannella & Horner use Horner & Goodwin’s work as an ontogenetic model in order to project 
the Triceratops’ developmental range over its life-span. For instance, squamosal (the bone at the 
back of the skull supporting the frill) elongation can be measured by comparing gross length 
against the ratio of squamosal length and width. Specimens of various ages can be plotted 
against these measurements. A line of best fit captures the four Triceratops life stages in 
sequence and, so they argue, Torosaurus (see fig 2). 
 
Figure 2: Squamosal elongation in Triceratops and Torosaurus (from Scannella & Horner 2010, pp1161) 
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Second, they undertook an osteohistological study. One way of identifying an organisms’ age 
is via its cell tissue. Young animals have porous, primary tissue, while older animals’ tissue is more 
condensed and they have more pronounced secondary osteons. Scannella & Horner examined 
the horns of several specimens and found that Triceratops horns were invariably more youthful. 
Additionally, Scannella & Horner cite the lack of juvenile Torosaurus, and their overlap in both 
location and strata, as further evidence. They also argue that some potentially youthful 
Torosaurus specimens have been misidentified. 
There are several, important, challenges to the ‘Toroceratops’ hypothesis. First, is it 
developmentally plausible that the Triceratops frill would thin and develop holes as it grew into 
‘Torosaurus’ adulthood? Although Horner & Lamm (2011) and Scannella & Horner (2011) point to 
the outlier Ceratopsidae, Nedoceratops, as a potential midway between the two, this is highly 
speculative. In other Ceratopsidae with thin, holed frills (such as Protoceratops) the holes are 
present from earliest frill development. Second, Maiorino, Farke & Piras (2013) construct a 
Ceratopsidae skull morphospace by measuring skulls and plotting them along various dimensions 
of transformation. From that basis they develop several other ‘developmental trajectories’ 
similar to Scannella & Horner’s which place Torosaurus in different, non-Triceratops areas of 
morphospace. Third, Longrich & Field (2012) examine Ceratopsidae of various ages and types to 
develop a general growth sequence, using this to identity both elderly Triceratops and juvenile 
Torosaurus. The hypothesis that ‘Torosaurus’ and ‘Triceratops’ are co-extensive is, at this point, 
open, but we’ve seen enough of the debate to draw some general lessons. 
Taxonomic identification in paleobiology relies on explaining morphological patterns in the 
fossil record. That is, to claim two specimens are the same species, paleobiologists must claim 
that interspecies processes such as phenotypic variation are a better explanation of their 
differences than intraspecies processes from divergent evolutionary histories. In the 
‘Toroceratops’ case, the central question is whether it is more plausible to take Triceratops and 
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Torosaurus specimens as taxonomically distinct or developmentally distinct. As Longrich & Field 
put it, 
Before one can use variation to classify species, it is necessary to understand the nature 
of that variation. That is, do the differences between two fossils represent variation 
between different species, which is a result of separate evolutionary histories, or do 
these differences reflect variation within a single species, which can result from variation 
within a population, sexual dimorphism, or change in morphology over the course of 
development (Longrich & Field 1)? 
(Notice that Longrich & Field switch from genera to species, in 6.4 I will discuss the 
consequences of this argument for higher taxa). To argue that Torosaurus and Triceratops ought 
to be lumped into the same genus, then, Scannella & Horner must convince us that the 
morphological range of the two sets of specimens are more plausibly explained by within-species 
phenotypic variation, be it due to differences between sexes, between individuals (including 
pathology) or differences in ontogenetic stage, than by between-species phenotypic variation. 
Rather than employing a particular species concept, species in paleontology are delineated 
contrastively, that is, if morphological variation cannot be explained as normal variation within a 
species, then species (or, as in this case, higher taxa) delineations should be made. And so, 
although paleo-taxonomies are constructed using morphological data, they are informed by the 
expected phenotypic diversity of the critters in question. Paleobiologists delineate species 
membership in terms of the processes which explain variation. 
It is important to note that folding Torosaurus into Triceratops is not merely of ‘natural paleo-
historic’ interest, that is, it matters for more than cataloguing Mesozoic fauna. First, it also forms 
the basis of further hypotheses about Triceratops behavior. If, for instance, Torosaurus are adult 
Triceratops, why are there so few of them, and what does this tell us about their social 
organization? Scannella and Horner speculate that either mature Triceratops lived apart from the 
herd, or that very few made it to full maturity. Moreover, what could be the purpose of such 
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phenotypic changes in later life? Here, Scannella and Horner hypothesize that the phenotypic 
differences functioned in conspecific maturity signaling. Second, it also informs wider discussion 
of the developmental capacities of Ceratopsidae and dinosaurs generally. If dinosaurs displayed a 
wide variety of within-species diversity across life stages, it is plausible that dinosaurs are less 
taxonomically diverse than we thought9.  Third, the debate feeds into investigations of life’s 
shape. For instance, an essential question in understanding the nature and causes of the K-Pg 
extinction event is whether dinosaur diversity was decreasing prior to the extra-terrestrial impact 
event. Whether the impact occurred while dinosaur life was flourishing or in decline tells us about 
the impact’s causal role in the extinction and, potentially, in mass-extinctions generally10. Folding 
together the only two Ceratopsidae genera present at the K-Pg boundary matters here, as does 
the thought that general dinosaur diversity may have been overestimated. Moreover, if I may 
speculate, the suggestion that dinosaurs, particularly larger herbivores, displayed extreme 
phenotypic diversity across life-cycles may explain the puzzlingly high biodiversity of large 
animals in late-Mesozoic North America. It could turn out that there were many less species than 
we thought11. 
In short, the ‘Toroceratops’ debate is not simply a matter of categorizing specimens, as it 
feeds into models of Ceratopsidae (and dinosaur generally) developmental patterns, biodiversity 
in the late-Cretaceous, the behaviour and ecology of Ceratopsidae, and even the nature of 
macroevolutionary change. Recall that Scannella & Horner’s success or otherwise is not my 
concern here, but how they illustrate paleobiologists’ taxonomic decisions.  
Let’s summarize the features of paleobiological practice represented by the ‘Torosaurus’ 
debate. As opposed to using some species concept or other, paleobiologists delineate species on 
explanatory grounds. Specifically, do interspecies or intraspecies processes best explain the 
                                                             
9 Indeed, Schott et al (2011) suggest this of pachycephalosaurus. 
10 See Schulte et al (2010) for a view which emphasizes the role of the impact, and Archibald et al (2010) 
for a view which sees it as one cause amongst many. 
11 See Roberts et al (in press) for discussion of the phenomenon. 
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range of variation across specimens? That is, taxonomic decisions in paleobiology are made on 
the basis of which processes best explain morphological differences: sexual dimorphism, 
pathologies, phenotypic variation, life-stage variation, or speciation. To argue that a specimen 
represents a new species, a paleobiologist must show that other processes are insufficient to 
generate the relevant variation, which requires consideration of:  
a. Models of ontogenetic development; 
b. Models of phenotype variation12 and pathology13; 
c. Models of sexual dimorphism; 
d. Overlap in strata or lack thereof; 
e. Fossil reconstruction and interpretation. 
Moreover, taxonomic decisions in paleobiology inform various questions of further 
paleobiological interest, in this case:   
f. The ecology, social strategies, and behaviour of species; 
g. Large-scale macroevolutionary patterns. 
In the next two sections I argue that these lessons show that paleobiological investigation is 
‘indifferent’ to the different species concepts which drove section 2’s pluralism, and that this 
underwrites a new argument for realism about the species category. 
4. Species concepts don’t matter. 
Pluralists highlight cases involving more than one, non-equivalent, equally legitimate species 
concept. The legitimacy of each concepts is derived from its ineliminable use in a legitimate 
                                                             
12 Pian et al (2013), for example, introduce a new extinct platypus species, Odurodon tharalkooschild, 
largely on the basis that its enormous size outruns the expected phenotypic range of any other platypus. 
13 A nice case of an objection to species delineation on the basis of pathology is the suggestion in 
Barham (2004) that Homo floresiensis, the so-called ‘Hobbits’, are merely humans exhibiting microcephaly. 
In fact, taxonomy is the subject of voracious debate in paleoanthropology: see, for instance, the back and 
forth between Ian Tattersal and Matt Cartmill, which concluded with the memorable Tattersal (2013). 
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research project. In this section, I argue that, at least sometimes in paleobiology, we see research 
programmes which are ‘indifferent’ to species concepts—it doesn’t matter which species 
concept is used. Moreover, at least sometimes this indifference is not simply due to 
paleobiologists ‘making do’ with impoverished evidence, but because of the nature of their 
inquiry.  
Indifference is a relation between a research project and a category essential to that project. 
The relation is instantiated when any legitimate specification of the category makes no difference 
to the research project. That is, given the method employed, it simply does not matter whether 
one specification or the other is used, or whether one or the other is ‘true’. It is important to 
distinguish between a project being ‘indifferent’ to a category, and the category being 
‘irrelevant’. Presumably, say, differing accounts of ‘virtuous agents’ are not relevant to 
paleobiological investigation. It doesn’t follow from this that paleobiological investigation is 
indifferent to the category of ‘virtuous agent’, because such a category must be employed by the 
investigation. Paleobiologists, I shall argue, are indifferent to the species category because they 
are in the business of examining, inferring from, and delineating species, but it doesn’t matter 
whether ‘species’ is understood according to a particular concept. Although differing ideas of 
‘virtuous agent’ also don’t matter to paleobiological investigation, this doesn’t count as 
indifference in my sense because such a category doesn’t play a role in paleobiological inquiry14. 
To demonstrate indifference, then, one must articulate how a category is identified and 
employed by some research project, and show that the method is applicable across various 
specifications of that category. In section 3 I attempted the first part of this task, here I show that 
picking a particular species concept will not change paleobiological method15. 
                                                             
14 Thanks to an anonymous referee for distinguishing between ‘indifference’ and ‘irrelevence’. 
15 Brandon Holter has suggested to me that indifference could come in degrees: that is, the 
identification criteria could matter more on some concept than others. He points to the ‘mate recognition’ 
species concept, whereby species are delineated via mating preferences which restrict gene-flow. 
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Arguments for pluralism turn on a lack of indifference between species concepts in different 
investigative contexts. From the preliminary glance in section 2, for instance, how we go about 
understanding asexual taxa depends a lot on which species concept is employed. Microbiology, 
which deals with such critters, then, is not indifferent to the species category: the biological 
concept is not suitable, while the phylogenetic sometimes is (microbiologists may be indifferent 
to other species concepts, of course). In contrast to this, the paleobiological method from 
section 3 is indifferent to the species category. Why? Because the hypotheses which 
paleobiologists need to control for in order to establish species-hood would count against 
species membership on any plausible species concept. 
I have two arguments regarding indifference, which each draw on section 3’s discussion of 
paleobiological practice. The first argument shows that species delineation in paleobiology 
requires controlling for contrast-cases which would be problematic no matter which concept is 
employed. The second argument points to the investigative concerns of paleobiologists: these 
tend to operate at a coarser grain than that provided by species concepts, although they are 
informed by species-level systematics and are prima facie about species. The significance of the 
latter point will become clear in section 5 when I argue for realism about the species category. 
Let’s begin with the phylogenetic concept. Here, two organisms are part of the same species 
if they are part of the same lineage—when they are ancestrally unified. If paleobiologists employ 
this concept, then, they are inferring from morphological character to clade membership. For 
simplicity, imagine we have a single fossil specimen f, and a single well established species S 
which f might belong to. Assuming that S is the only plausible known species into which f could 
fit, we have two possible hypotheses: 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Assuming the recognised features are morphological (rather than, say, hormonal), these criteria may 
matter more for that species concept than, say, a phylogenetic one. Formally, I take indifference to be 
binary, but I don’t think this matters for the argument herein. 
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H1: f is a member of S, that is, f is part of the historical lineage S16 
H2: f is not a member of S, that is, f is not part of the historical lineage S 
To support H2, and thus declare f a new species, paleobiologists must show that f’s 
morphological characteristics do not fall within the range expected of S, that is, demonstrate 
that, given the phenotypic range of S, it is unlikely that f’s characteristics can be explained in 
terms of S-hood (i.e., the within-species processes that cause polymorphism). This, of course, is 
precisely what we saw in section 3. And so, if paleobiologists use a phylogenetic concept, this will 
not affect their methodology. 
Now, biological concepts. Here, the inference is from morphological characters to breeding 
population17. The analogue competing hypotheses would be as follows: 
H1*: f is a member of S, that is, f is part of breeding population S 
H2*: f is not a member of S, that is, f is not part of breeding population S 
Like lineages, breeding populations (at least of vertebrates!) share phenotypic characters, 
and so an inference from morphology to breeding population is partially licensed. Again, to 
support H2, paleobiologists must show that membership of S is not a sufficient explanation of f’s 
morphological divergence from accepted members of S. In other words, they must show that f 
does not fall within the expected phenotypic, developmental and pathological range of S. Again, 
paleobiological method is not sensitive to the biological species concept: their practices for 
distinguishing between species don’t turn on whether we use that specification or not. 
This is a demonstration that species delineation in paleobiology is indifferent to the species 
category, at least in terms of the biological and phylogenetic species concepts. Even though as a 
                                                             
16 One way of stating this would be to claim that S forms a monophyletic clade of which f is a member, 
or that S is an historical individual of which f is a part. 
17 There is, in fact, one case of fossil organisms caught in an extremely extended coitus interruptus: a 
group of Eocene turtles (see Joyce et al 2012). 
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matter of fact, the two concepts would divide some groups of dinosaurs differently (as some 
dinosaur breeding populations are probably not monophyletic clades, and some dinosaur 
monophyletic clades are probably not breeding groups) the inference of paleobiologists does not 
distinguish between these. 
The same goes for other species concepts. Take, for instance, ‘ecospecies’: species are 
delineated in terms of their ecological role (although typically these are discussed as ‘ecotypes’ 
within interbreeding populations). Here, f is a member of S just in case f falls within the range of 
ecological function expected of S. As we have already seen, paleobiologists use morphological 
characteristics as an inroad to various functional ascriptions—i.e., the dramatic changes in 
Ceratopsidae frill across developmental stages is taken as a signal of relative maturity—and this 
is true of ecological function as well. Again, in answering this question paleobiologists must 
decide whether the best explanation of morphological (and thus inferred ecological) divergence 
is inter- or intra-species.  
We should pause to consider morphological species concepts and related similarity-based, or 
‘phenetic’ conceptions. Here, species are conceived in terms of anatomical criteria, or grouped 
via similarity. This concept is sometimes linked to paleobiology (e.g Kitcher 1984). I think this is a 
mistake. Consider two types of morphological species concept, ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. ‘Weak’ 
concepts use morphological criteria to infer species. ‘Species’ are not defined in terms of 
morphological criteria, but those features are used as proxies. The discussion in section 3 shows 
that this does not do justice to how taxonomic judgments are made in paleobiology. They do not 
merely infer from morphological criteria, but morphological criteria which are validated given 
various models of phenotypic, sexual, developmental and pathological variation within the 
species concerned (plus strata location). To say that paleobiologists make taxonomic decisions 
via similarity or morphology alone is a gross over-simplification. ‘Strong’ concepts define species 
in terms of those characteristics. This does not do justice to the kind of work which 
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paleontologists put species delineations to. Scannella and Horner use their new Ceratopsidae 
taxonomy to inform reconstructions of biodiversity levels prior to the K-Pg boundary, and thus 
the nature of the extinction event. They also draw on their taxonomic claim to speculate about 
the nature of Ceratopsidae life-ways and development. Such considerations involve viewing their 
targets as more than just morphologically similar groups, but as interacting, developing, breeding 
lineages and populations. The agnosticism inherent in phenetic or morphological species 
concepts (or pattern cladism, for that matter), then, does not make sense of the work 
paleobiologists put species to. Paleobiologists, then, are not indifferent to these kinds of 
concepts. I discuss whether this causes problems in 6.1. 
My second claim about indifference is perhaps best read as a response to an objection to the 
first. The objection goes as follows. Yes, the paleobiological method of inferring species 
membership is indifferent to the species category, but this is only due to their epistemic situation. 
Paleobiologists typically find themselves describing species on the basis of biased, incomplete 
and degraded specimens—they have no choice but to merely apply a contrastive, abductive 
criteria. If they had better information, it would surely then matter which species concepts were 
used. This objection agrees that paleobiologists are indifferent, but distinguishes between 
vindicatory indifference and circumstantial indifference. Indifference is vindicatory when it is at 
least in part generated by the aims of the research, while circumstantial indifference is due to 
scientists ‘making do’ with what they have. Establishing vindicatory indifference is required for 
the realism of the next section. 
Paleobiologists are not only (or even primarily!) interested in reconstructing past 
environments and organisms, they also seek to explain macro-evolutionary patterns. That is, 
what forces are to blame for the patterns we identify in the record? This project involves first 
finding meaningful patterns in paleobiological information: and this can be a daunting task (see 
Benton 1999, Turner 2009). On the assumption that macroevolutionary patterns are sometimes 
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correctly identified, such patterns require explanation. For instance, as we saw, recent work on 
Ceratopsidae developmental biology has important consequences for our understanding of 
large-scale events such as the K-Pg extinction. Taxonomic decisions, even at the species level, 
matter for getting the general shape of these patterns. But only the general shape is required. For 
instance, seeing whether biodiversity levels decreased towards the K-Pg boundary does not 
require fine-grained species delineation, only establishing a general trend. This is true of many 
macro-evolutionary investigations. Here is the point: in such contexts, paleobiological 
investigation targets ‘species’ in some coarse, general sense—they are not making claims about 
particular taxa, but rather those taxa are used as data points to inform a discussion about how 
the general category behaves. 
Consider the debate about species sorting: is there some directionality, some regularity, 
influencing which species go extinct and which survive? On one extreme, sorting is ‘random’: 
extinction is a lottery. On another extreme, species selection is pervasive, that is, species 
themselves are in evolutionary competition and some have features which both ensure their 
survival and increase their chances of spawning daughter-species. Paleobiologists tackle this 
question on several fronts: they simulate speciation events and taxonomic development using 
computational aids (the classic “MBL” model is an example), construct large-scale taxonomic 
data sets from fossil finds18, and provide more detailed case-studies of apparent competition 
between particular species. In this debate, what determines the fate of species is the central 
concern, but getting species delineation accurate to the species-concept level is simply 
unnecessary. Even with richer access to information, the scale required of inquiries into species-
sorting and other macroevolutionary trends makes membership on the species-concept scale 
irrelevant (see Turner 2011 chapter 5 for an introduction to species sorting). Note that the debate 
is about species: whether or not the fate of species over macroevolutionary time is random or is 
                                                             
18 Note that paleobiologists frequently represent this information in terms of higher-taxa categories. 
This is typically because the fossil record is sometimes less biased when considered by genus or family. 
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subject to selection. However, it is not about particular species taxa. Paleobiologists are 
interested in a species category which (as we’ll see) is more general than that allowed by pluralist 
anti-realists. 
And so, to answer many paleobiological questions, we do need to make species-level 
taxonomic decisions, but these decisions needn’t be particularly accurate. In other words, even if 
much richer information relevant to make between-species-concept delineations were available, 
these would make no meaningful difference to many of the projects which paleobiologists are 
concerned with. In other words, at least some of the time, paleobiological indifference to the 
species category is vindicatory. Before moving to realism, we should get clear on what I’m going 
to suggest we should be realists about. 
As we’ve seen, paleobiologists sometimes argue for propositions about particular taxa 
(‘Torosaurus and Triceratops are the same species’) and about species generally (‘species have 
differential rates of survival and radiation because there are fitness differences at the species 
level’). Let’s imagine some such claims are true. In virtue of what would they be so? By 
indifference, it cannot be due to any particular taxa as delineated by a species concept. If, for 
instance, Scannella and Horner’s hypothesis was true just in case it was true by the phylogenetic 
species concept, this would suggest their project was not indifferent after all.  
I want to suggest that the general species category is the target of paleobiological 
investigation (in section 6.5 we’ll discuss whether paleobiologists have their own species 
concept). First, notice that the kinds of investigations I appealed to in arguing for vindicatory 
indifference are not about any particular species taxa, but about species in general. Consider the 
idea that species sorting is explained via species selection, that is, species having differential 
rates of survival is due to fitness differences between them. Both the explananda and the 
explanans here are species and their properties, but it is a general claim about species overall. It 
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is about neither particular taxa, nor a particular specification. So, paleobiologists are discussing a 
general category of ‘species’—it is this category which I’ll argue is real, next section. 
But what might such a category be like, how should we characterize it? We must tread 
somewhat carefully here. Given that various species concepts are supposed to be specifications 
of the species category, the target of paleobiologists ought to somehow ‘contain’ those 
specifications. But this can create real problems. Imagine, for the sake of the argument, that it 
turned out that Triceratops and Torosaurus are the same species by one species concept, but are 
different species by another. If the species category is simply the combination of those various 
legitimate specifications, then the claim that ‘Triceratops and Torosaurus is the same species’ 
comes out both true and false. This is not a good result: I don’t want to commit to there being 
true contradictions19! Happily, there is a solution to this problem. Instead of taking the general 
category to be the combination of (or perhaps the disjunction of) the various specifications, I can 
take it as the maximally consistent conjunction of the specifications20. That is, we take the largest 
set of the results of legitimate species specifications which are non-contradictory, and take this 
as what paleobiological discussion is about21. This would avoid contradiction. It also gives us a 
sense of what kind of category I’m going to suggest exists: the general species category is the 
maximally consistent conjunction of legitimate species specifications and, at least sometimes, it is 
the target of paleobiological investigation. 
5.  Indifference Realism 
I have argued that paleobiology is indifferent to the species category, which I have 
characterized as the maximally consistent conjunction of legitimate species specifications. In this 
section, I argue from this indifference to the category’s existence. To do this, I need a principle 
                                                             
19 Thanks to David Leibesman for highlighting this problem. 
20 An analogous move is suggested in Lewis (1978). 
21 It may turn out that some paleobiological claims are indeterminate on this kind of view, and as David 
Leibesman has pointed out to me, this might involve exploring whether vagueness might undermine the 
link between practice and ontology. 
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which connects indifference to realism: why would one take a project’s indifference about a 
category’s specifications to be grounds for realism about that category? Recall that the 
traditional pluralist position drew justification from the legitimacy of the research program in 
question. Concepts gain legitimacy from the programs requiring them. And, moreover, we should 
be realists about the categories such concepts pick out for the same reason. My thought is that 
the species category gains legitimacy in a similar way. Because paleobiological research is 
indifferent—and indifferent in a vindicatory way—we should be realists about the general 
species category. I will state the principle, and then defend it. 
Indifference principle: when some legitimate investigation is indifferent in regards to some 
category, in a vindicatory sense, then we ought to be realists about that category. 
How does the principle work? Recall that many pluralists reach their ontological conclusions 
via scientific practice. That is, legitimate scientific categorization practices underwrite claims 
about the existence or otherwise of those categories. Consider the following from Kitcher. He is 
comparing two accounts of ‘virus’, one focusing on morphological patterns, and the other on the 
genetic properties which in part explain those patterns. He first points out that the two concepts 
are non-equivalent, and then shifts to ontology. 
Our reclassification [from morphological patterns to genetic properties] may prompt us 
to differentiate viruses that we would have formerly have heaped together, or to regard 
as mere “variants”, organisms previously viewed as of radically different types. But, 
irrespective of any reforms it may induce, the achievement of an explanatory framework 
goes hand in hand with a scheme for delineating the “real kinds” in nature (Kitcher 1984, 
322). 
Although Kitcher’s scare quotes suggest a certain hedging on his part, there is a clear link 
here between the success of a concept, its relationship to an explanatory framework, and 
ontological claims. It is just the same kind of link which leads us from indifference to realism 
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about a category, despite the disunified nature of the category’s specifications. There is, then, a 
parity of reasoning argument to be made for pluralists who accept said link. 
Note, importantly, that the indifference principle does not only require that an investigation 
be indifferent to a category—that various specifications make no difference to practice—but 
also that the investigation is legitimate, and the indifference is vindicatory. This combination, it 
seems to me, has just the ingredients required to provide the link between success and ontology. 
Paleobiological species delineations are part of a successful explanatory framework. If Scannella 
& Horner are right, and Torosaurus are mature Triceratops, then presumably they have generated 
knowledge, and knowledge is about something, and scientific knowledge is about real things. The 
success of paleobiological practice in species delineation gives reason to think that the species 
category (not simply the categories picked out by various specifications) exists. 
In section 4 I argued that (1) paleobiology is indifferent to the species category. This is to say 
that various specifications of ‘species’ do not make a difference to how paleobiologists go about 
identifying them. (2) That this indifference is vindicatory. That is, at least some of the indifference 
is due to the research target, not merely to epistemic or pragmatic constraints. I take it we can 
assume (3) that paleobiological research interests are legitimate. If the indifference principle is 
true, then, we have an argument for realism about the species category even if the category is 
not unified (that is, there is no one account which captures it). 
As I see it, the anti-realist about the species category faces a dilemma. To deny the 
indifference principle, they must deny that paleobiological indifference is vindicatory, or that 
paleobiology is legitimate, or reject the link between scientific practice and ontology. In a sense, 
this is unsurprising. Pluralism is founded on a naturalist philosophical methodology, and in 
essence my argument seeks to legitimize the species category in virtue of that method: 
employment by a successful science is a route to ontological legitimacy. The first two anti-realist 
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options require delegitimizing paleobiological practice, and the third denies the very 
epistemology which pluralism is founded on22.  
A final point: it may of course be that, in some contexts, paleobiologists do concern 
themselves with questions where species-concepts matter, and perhaps in some contexts they 
do have the information required to delineate between them. This is not necessarily a problem 
for my argument, as all that is required is that at least sometimes (and important sometimes) 
paleobiological work is indifferent to species concepts. 
And so, we should be realists about the general species category, even though it is in a sense 
disunified, that is, precisified by a plurality of non-equivalent concepts. 
6. Objections 
I have staked out three different kinds of claim in this paper. First, a claim about 
paleobiological practice. Specifically, paleobiologists delineate between species on the basis of 
explanatory criteria. To show that a specimen is deserving of a new species name, it must be 
shown that intraspecies processes rather than interspecies processes better account for the 
relevant range of variation between it and other specimens. Second, a claim about naturalist 
routes to ontology. Specifically, when a legitimate investigation is indifferent to a set of non-
equivalent specifications of a category, in a vindicatory sense, we have grounds to be realists 
about that category in spite of its disunity. Third, these are combined to make a claim about the 
species category. Specifically, that paleobiological practice is indifferent to the species category 
(claim one), and that indifference provides reason for realism (claim two), shows that we should 
be realists about the species category. I think that these claims can be challenged in fruitful ways, 
so I want to finish by briefly considering a set of objections. 
                                                             
22 Naturally, for epistemic anti-realists such as Stanford and Rosenberg, this is less pressing. Although, 
if they are realists about various taxa which species concept pick out, there remains a tension.  
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6.1 Paleobiologists are not indifferent to all species concepts. 
Perhaps paleobiologists are indifferent to some, but not all, legitimate species concepts. For 
instance, it could turn out that pattern cladism or pheneticism play an important role in some 
research program or other. If my argument in section 4 is right, then how paleobiologists 
delineate species does not cohere with those concepts. If that turns out to be the case, then it 
seems I cannot claim to have established the existence of the species category, as it includes 
some, but not all, species concepts. 
We should not get too caught up in what we call a ‘species’, establishing the existence of a 
general (but disunified!) category is what matters here (see footnote 7). If there are some 
legitimate species concepts for which paleobiology is not indifferent, then my argument 
establishes taxa-category realism, rather than species realism. Having said this, I’m not convinced 
that pattern cladism or pheneticism do underwrite legitimate research programs. For this 
objection to bite, it must be established that there is a species concept such that (1) paleobiology 
is not indifferent to it, and (2) it underwrites a legitimate research program. If this was achieved, I 
would happily give up my talk of the ‘species’ category, and be content to have established the 
existence of a taxa category23. 
More generally, the answer to this kind of objection is further examination of scientific 
practice, and of course there is a limit to how much can be managed in a paper of this nature.  
6.2 Is it the same species category for everyone? 
A related, and I think important, objection asks whether the species category established by 
paleobiological practice does the job of unifying biological systemization24. That is, when we 
commit to the species category, we are supposed to be committing to a general target of 
                                                             
23 Marc Ereshesfsky raised this objection. 
24 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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biological investigation. But if we are realists about the particular taxa picked out by various 
species concepts, surely some biologists simply mean something else by ‘species’ than the 
paleobiologists do. I’m not convinced that unifying biological discussion of species ought to be a 
criteria for realism about a general species category, but regardless think that there is at least 
some reason to think that paleobiological practice does, in fact, achieve this. 
The force of my response, I think, turns on the scope of paleobiological investigation. When I 
argued that paleobiological indifference is vindicatory, I highlighted the large-scale questions 
they ask. Paleobiologists grapple with the shape of life on the macro-scale. This includes asking 
whether, and on what grounds, life’s history could have been different: how contingent or 
determinate (and based on what) are the fates of taxa? Such questions, it seems to me, 
potentially unify biological investigation of species insofar as they are on the broadest relevant 
scale. Other biological investigations, say into the development and evolutionary history of 
viruses which Kitcher discussed, pick out valid sub-sets of the general kind ‘species’, engineered 
to the smaller-scale inquiry at hand. By examining species at the broadest level, inclusive of (and 
indifferent to) the various specifications required for finer grained biological investigations, 
paleobiology does do significant unificatory work. 
This response is speculative and establishing it (or undermining it) would involve a deeper 
examination of scientific practice. Specifically, are there legitimate investigations who target 
species concepts which fall outside of paleobiology’s remit, or alternatively is there a broader 
category still? 
6.3 Weird categories cannot exist. 
There might be something wrong a priori with establishing the existence of the kind of 
category I’ve discussed: one which consists in the maximally consistent conjunction of a set of 
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specifications25, where the specifications are non-equivalent. If someone outright rejects the 
possibility of such categories, then my argument still shows us something. Either the species 
category is unified after all—pluralism is false—or paleobiology is illegitimate. After all, if 
paleobiology is legitimate, and that research programme is indifferent to species concepts, and 
there are no categories like that, then the species category must be unified. If paleobiology is 
indifferent to species concepts, and pluralism is true, and there are no such categories, then 
paleobiology must be illegitimate. I’m not sure which of these paths are better, or why they 
would be preferable to simply accepting these categories into one’s ontology. 
However, making ontological decisions on a priori grounds is not in the spirit of the species 
debate. Ontological claims come from scientific practice, not from preconceived notions of what 
there is or what there must be. After all, it is the use of various species concepts in scientific 
practice which underlies pluralism in the first place, and so it would be odd for pluralists to 
abandon the naturalist underpinnings of their own position. A legitimate, successful science is 
indifferent to various species concepts and so, if the argument from 5 goes through, pluralists 
should commit to the existence of the species category—and to other disunified categories 
meeting the same criteria.  
Pluralists unhappy with this conclusion should re-evaluate the link between practice and 
ontology. Indeed, some might take my argument as a reductio against such a link! Just what is 
required to draw ontological conclusions from scientific practice? If the analogy between 
                                                             
25 This kind of objection could be made via appeal to work from the philosophy of mind on disjunctive 
properties. Hilary Putnam (1967), Ned Block and Jerry Fodor (Block & Fodor 1972, Fodor 1974) have argued 
that disjunctive kinds are illegitimate. In that context, the argument centers on the nature of multiple-
realizability: a large number of different substrates, in different arrangements, could potentially have what 
it takes to be a particular propositional attitude. It is likely, for instance, that a different neural correlate is 
involved with my thinking x than for your thinking x. However, it seems as if we can think the same x, that 
is, our xs can have the same content. If so, then either propositional attitudes should be characterized 
functionally (or in some other non-reductive way), or the identity theorist may accept a disjunction of those 
various substrates as a real kind. In rejecting identity-theory, then, philosophers of mind have argued 
against admitting disjunctive kinds into our ontology.  
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pluralism and indifference is broken, my argument would collapse. However, to do so, they must 
tell us which features of indifference block ontological conclusions, and why. 
6.4  Higher taxa. 
The debate about the taxonomic relationship between Triceratops and Torosaurus is in part 
about genera, not species. Does this argument then commit us to the existence of higher taxa as 
well? I suspect so, but with reservations. First, to repeat myself, focussing on what gets to be 
called a ‘species’ is not an interesting debate. I am happy to be a ‘taxa-category’ realist and be 
done with it.  
Second, recall that my case study is representative of how species delineations are made in 
paleobiology. It does not follow from paleobiologists using the same method to identify different 
levels of taxa that arguments about one taxa carry over to another. What matters is the role such 
taxa play in paleobiological work: remember, it is the borrowed legitimacy from scientific practice 
which grants realism. Moreover, the indifference must be vindicatory: scientists must be 
appealing to higher taxa not due to circumstance, but due to their investigative target. A fuller 
investigation of paleobiological practice would be required to determine whether higher-taxa 
categories were also treated indifferently and in a vindicatory manner. I suspect that some will 
be, for instance the phylum-level importance of ‘body-plans’ has been a foundational for 
paleobiology. I leave that investigation for later work26. 
6.5 A species concept for paleobiology? 
Finally, there is a pressing objection to my claim that paleobiological practice is indifferent to 
species concepts. Surely, rather than picking out a general species category, or a disjunction or 
                                                             
26 Marc Ereshefsky raised this objection. 
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conjunction of different species concepts, they simply have their own concept27? If so, then we 
do not get a general species category, but instead yet another sub-category—the paleobiological 
one. But what would the paleontological species concept look like? 
I have been discussing concepts as being (something like) instructions for carving up the 
world. They are functions which take us from states of affairs to categories. The biological 
species concept, for instance, takes us from facts about interbreeding populations to species 
delineations. Paleobiologists do not apply a criteria like this to establish species membership or 
otherwise. Rather, they examine the spread of variation between specimens and ask whether the 
best explanation of said variation appeals to interspecies factors or intraspecies factors. This is 
not a concept, a recipe for producing categories from states of affairs. Rather, it is an abductive 
practice for determining species membership. But ‘species’ in what sense? The point of 
indifference is that it would be a mistake to identify paleobiological discussion of species with 
any particular species concept. Their method is not sensitive to which species concept is 
employed. Moreover, this indifference is vindicatory, it is at least sometimes due to the kinds of 
questions paleobiologists ask (as opposed to their underprivileged epistemic status). This 
suggests that, despite not using a concept as I have understood it here, the link from practice to 
ontology is maintained. Paleobiologists do not have a species concept, but they do generate 
knowledge about species. And not only knowledge about particular taxa, but about how species 
generally behave in macroevolution. What else might this knowledge be about, if not a general 
species category? 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued for realism about the species category (being the maximally consistent 
conjunction of species specifications) on grounds of paleobiological practice. Because 
                                                             
27 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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paleobiologists generate knowledge about their subjects, and because their subjects are 
sometimes species (but not species according to any particular species-concept), we should 
believe in the species category. This argument relies upon the notion of ‘indifference’. This 
notion, and its relation to realism through the argument from section 5, is ripe for application in 
other areas. I also hope to have shown in section 6 that, if I am wrong, I am wrong in interesting 
and fruitful ways. Finally, this paper has a message for paleobiologists who are perhaps less 
concerned about issues of realism: don’t worry about species-concepts. 
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